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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF
POST-ARREST SILENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES. Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
In Doyle v. Ohio1 the United States Supreme Court held2 that a
defendant's post-arrest silence following receipt of Miranda warnings
3
may not be used for impeachment purposes during cross-examination.
Although the Court based its decision on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 4 this rationale is contrary to prior pronouncements
on the subject.' Employment of such silence as substantive evidence of
guilt had previously been held prohibited by the fifth amendment,6 but its
use for impeachment had been treated on an evidentiary basis.7 In revising
its stance the Court reasoned that it would be fundamentally unfair to
permit the defendant to be impeached by his silence after having been
implicitly assured by the Miranda warnings that silence would carry no
penalty.' The Doyle holding thus buttresses the eroding protective rampart
furnished by Miranda v. Arizona.9
Defendants Doyle and Wood had arranged, according to state's
evidence, to sell ten pounds of marijuana to a police informant. After the
transaction was completed, the defendants discovered that they had been
paid less than the agreed price. While attempting to relocate the informant
and the remaining cash, defendants were intercepted by the police,
arrested, and given Miranda warnings. During separate trials both defend-
ants contended that they had been framed and that they, in fact, were the
ones buying from the informant. On cross-examination the prosecutor
1. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
2. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Prior to custodial interrogation the
individual must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that he has the right to presence
of counsel during interrogation and appointed counsel if he is indigent, and that any
statements made may subsequently be used against him. Id. at 478-79.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
6. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Griffin dealt with prior silence at trial, but
the distinction between post-arrest silence and trial silence in the context of implying guilt is
slight. Courts considering the issue have so held. See, e.g., United States v. Fairchild, 505
F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 594 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969).
7. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
8. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
asked them why they had not previously related this exculpatory story to
the arresting officers. Respective defense counsel objected to this question,
but in both cases were overruled.'o
Following conviction, each defendant appealed to the county court of
appeals alleging, inter alia, that the prosecutor's references to the ac-
cused's post-arrest silence infringed upon his constitutional rights. "1 The
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the evidence was used solely to
impeach, not as substantive evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court of Ohio
denied further review and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari specifically to rule on the constitutionality of utilizing post-arrest
silence for impeachment purposes. 12
At common law, a defendant's pre-trial silence was generally admis-
sible to impeach his testimony at trial' 3 provided there existed a true
inconsistency between the prior silence and his subsequent testimony. 14
One year before Doyle the Supreme Court considered this principle in
relation to post-arrest silence in United States v. Hale.'5 There, in a
substantially similar procedural setting, 16 the Court coupled an evidentiary
analysis with the tenets of Grunewald v. United States, 17 holding that
post-arrest silence, even absent Miranda warnings, was likely to be
ambiguous and rarely capable of establishing the requisite degree of
inconsistency. 18 The Hale decision failed, however, to reach the constitu-
tional issue.' 9 Doyle briefly nodded toward this evidentiary base when it
10. 426 U.S. 610, 611-14. Doyle's exchange with the prosecutor was as follows:
Q: [Y]ou said in a response to a question of Mr. Beamer [the arresting officer]-'l
don't know what you are talking about.'
A: I believe what I said,-'What's this all about?' If I remember, that's the only
thing I said.
The response of Wood was similar. Id. at 615 n.5.
11. Defendants claimed two other errors of constitutional dimensions. First, each was
cross-examined concerning his silence at pre-trial proceedings. Second, each was questioned
concerning his post-arrest silence while testifying as a defense witness at the other's trial. In
light of its opinion, the Court failed to reach these issues. Id. at 616 n.6.
12. Id. at 616.
13. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (Chadhourn rev. ed. 1970).
14. Id. § 1040. To determine inconsistency the following question was posed: "[W]ould
it have been natural for the person to make the assertion in question?" Id. § 1042, at 1058.
15. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
16. After arrest Hale was read Miranda warnings. He refused to explain to the arresting
officers his possession of 158 dollars, but offered an exculpatory statement at trial. On
cross-examination the prosecutor questioned him regarding his previous silence. The trial
court instructed the jury to disregard the remark but refused to declare a mistrial. The court of
appeals reversed. Id. at 173-74.
17. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). In Grunewald the defendant responded to certain questions in a
manner consistent with innocence. On cross-examination the prosecutor elicited the informa-
tion that the defendant had invoked his fifth amendment privilege when confronted with the
identical questions during a grand jury hearing. Based on an evidentiary analysis his
conviction was reversed by the Court. In the decision the Court articulated three broad
factors militating against the silence-as-inconsistency concept: repeated assertions of inno-
cence; the secretive nature of the grand jury tribunal; and the focus on the subject as a
potential defendant. Id. at 422-24.
18. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180(1975). Application of the Grunewald three
factor test (see note 17 supra) to post-arrest silence creates an "even stronger [case] for
exclusion." Id. at 179.
19. The asserted purpose of the Hale decision was to resolve a conflict in the federal
courts of appeal on the subject. Compare United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir.
1974), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); United States v. Semensohn
421 F.2d 1206 (2nd Cir. 1970) (evidence of post-arrest silence not admissible for impeach-
noted that "every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of
what the State is required to advise the person arrested.'"20
Although the Court's due process argument seemed novel, it had been
presaged by Justice White's concurring opinion in Hale, from which the
Doyle Court quoted extensively:
[W]hen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires
. . . it seems to me that it does not comport with due process to
permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his
silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not
speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he
need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the
truth of his trial testimony.21
Hale had not been informed that his silence might be used against him, and
since Justice White determined that "anyone" would interpret the Miran-
da warnings to preclude the use of silence, the procedure was fundamental-
ly unfair.
22
Fundamental fairness is essential to the concept of justice; failure to
accord it to a criminal defendant constitutes a denial of due process.
23
Thus, if the state through its agents-police officers in this case-informs a
suspect that anything he says may be used against him, while he has a right
to remain silent, the accused would seem to have been actively misled if
such silence is employed for impeachment purposes at trial. The majority
in Doyle found support for this conclusion in Johnson v. United States.24
In Johnson, the trial judge allowed defendant to assert his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination. On appeal
following conviction the Court assumed that it would not have been error,
given the peculiar circumstances, to refuse granting the right to silence.
25
Nevertheless, the Court unanimously concluded that the privilege, once
accorded, made comment on the defendant's silence erroneous, citing the
ment), with Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3rd Cir. 1974); United States v. Ramirez,
441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971) (evidence of post-arrest silence
admissible for impeachment).
The divergence was not confined to the federal courts. Compare, e.g., People v. Bobo,
390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973) (evidence of post-arrest silence not admissible for
impeachment), with State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 908 (1969) (evidence of post-arrest silence admissible for impeachment).
The Hale decision was an exercise by the Supreme Court of its supervisory power over
the federal courts. It was merely suggestive for state courts. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 112
Ariz. 271, 540 P.2d 1252 (1975); Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975). Federal
courts noted that the evidentiary base of Hale permitted results contrary to the Court's
intended conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1976). The
decision was patently deficient. For a full discussion of Hale see Comment, Impeachment of a
Criminal Defendant by Evidence of Post-Arrest Silence: A Conflict Partially Resolved, 61
IOWA L. REV. 641 (1975).
20. 426 U.S. at 617 (emphasis added). Although the Court cited Hale, this is an
extension of the previous opinion since the writers of Hale had merely considered silence
likely to be ambiguous given the particular circumstances of the arrest. United States v. Hale,
422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
21. 422 U.S. at 182-83 (concurring opinion).
22. Id.
23. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
24. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
25. Id. at 196.
"elementary fairness" to the defendant of not misleading him on the
point.
2 6
Dissenting from the Court in Doyle, however, Justice Stevens be-
lieved that no misleading is possible in situations resembling Doyle if the
suspect did not specifically rely on the Miranda warnings in electing to
remain silent. He contended that Doyle and Wood neither indicated their
reliance on the officer's warnings in refusing information nor stood totally
mute. 27 Further, their explanatory remarks at trial indicated confusion
rather than a consideration of the Miranda warnings as the cause of
silence. 8 Hence, the dissent saw no reason to invoke a due process
rationale.
The validity of this reasoning is dubious. Assuming a suspect remains
silent but does not state clearly that he is doing so in reliance on the
Miranda warnings, the sole method of determining the basis for his action
is to inquire as to the motive for his silence on cross-examination. It is,
however, precisely at this point that the majority perceives the fundamental
unfairness to attach.29 Regardless of the defendant's response concerning
his silence he loses credibility in the eyes of the jury. If his explanation is
not grounded on an understanding of the Miranda warnings then he might,
according to Justice Stevens, be impeached by the inconsistent silence.
30
But even if the testimony does reflect a conscious invocation of the fifth
amendment privilege, the Court has previously recognized that such an
account is unlikely to override the strong negative inference probably
drawn by the jury regarding the post-arrest silence. 3' Thus, as the Fifth
Circuit has noted, "We would be naive if we failed to recognize that most
laymen view an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege as a badge of
guilt.' '32 A "penalty" is therefore incurred by the possible assertion of a
constitutional right. 33 Due process, however, requires that no such penalty
26. Id. at 196-97. Doyle is distinguishable, however. Johnson dealt with an explicit
assurance that certain actions would not subsequently be used against the defendant, while
the Miranda warnings contain an arguably implied assurance. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423
(1959), is therefore more in point. In Raley, three defendants relied on the explicit stipulation
of the chairman of a state investigatory committee that the fifth amendment privilege was
available to them. One defendant was also implicitly assured, by the chairman's actions, of
the propriety of her fifth amendment invocation. Id. at 437. They were nevertheless
convicted for refusing to answer questions presented to them when it was subsequently
discovered that a particular Ohio immunity statute was inapplicable. The Court reversed the
convictions on the theory that misleading dictates of the state are constitutionally infirm. Id.
at 438. Accord, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965). A federal court of appeals has
termed this type of misleading "quasi-entrapment." United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225,
226 (9th Cir. 1970).
27. 426 U.S. at 622 (dissenting opinion). The majority evidently considered the defend-
ants' random remarks tantamount to silence. This would appear reasonable. See Common-
wealth v. Greco, 227 Pa. Super. 19, 22-23, 323 A.2d 132, 134 (1974) (casual conversation with
arresting officers held not a waiver of fifth amendment rights). It would be unrealistic to
afford a suspect only two methods of invoking his fifth amendment privilege, i.e., absolute
silence or a detailed articulation of his reliance on the Miranda warnings in refusing to
respond.
28. 426 U.S. at 622.
29. Id. at 619 n.10.
30. Id. at 624-26 (dissenting opinion).
31. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
32. Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1968).
33. This concept of penalty is derived from Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609(1965), in
attach. Due process is not geared toward ascertainment of truth, but rather
toward ensuring fundamental fairness.3 4 In order to prevent such a penalty
situation from arising, the Court deemed it necessary to prohibit any line of
questioning dealing with a post-arrest silence that may involve the exercise
of a fifth amendment privilege.
35
The "penalty" in Doyle-type situations may be viewed as attaching at
either of two points. First, it may attach at the time of arrest, at which point
the defendant's decision whether to respond to questioning is fettered by
the knowledge that if he elects not to respond he may be forced to
perpetuate his silence for fear of subsequent impeachment.36 Second, if he
does remain silent he is penalized when he takes the stand and the
prosecutor is allowed to draw negative inferences from the "inconsisten-
cy" between his prior silence and his testimony at trial.37
While a burden, or penalty, is apparent, not every burden upon the
exercise of a constitutional right is necessarily infirm.38 The present
position of the Court holds that if there is a legitimate state interest in
a procedure it will be upheld even though it burdens, as an "incidental
consequence," the invocation of a constitutional right. 39 The salient
inquiry, therefore, is whether the use of post-arrest silence to impeach a
defendant's trial testimony advances such an interest. 4 Undeniably, the
state has an interest in impeaching the testimony of a defendant,41 and the
which the Court found a constitutional violation when a state prosecutor attempted to imply
guilt on the basis of defendant's failure to give certain testimony. Id. at 615. The Court
reasoned that to allow such comment would have burdened defendant in that the prosecutor
could urge guilt from the assertion of the privilege regardless of whether defendant took the
stand. The penalty in Doyle, however, is different and arguably of a lesser degree. For a more
complete articulation of the penalty concept vis-a-vis impeachment by post-arrest silence see
Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest Silence, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 940, 954-73 (1975).
34. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). This is evident from the numerous
coerced confession cases. independent corroborative evidence often demonstrated the
truthfulness of the confession. The paramount concern of community fair play, however,
demanded that the confessions not be admitted. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541
(1961).
35. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976). Despite this holding, post-arrest silence
may be used for impeachment if the defendant has testified that he actively cooperated with
the police at the time of arrest. In this case the silence is not used to impeach an exculpatory
statement but to contradict the defendant's behavior. Id. n. 11.
Unfortunately, the Court failed to explicate the principles implicit in such a penalty
rationale, principles that were assailed by Justice Stevens in dissent. Justice Stevens noted
that the penalty argument rests heavily on mere dictum articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966):
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual
for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial
interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood
mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
Id. at 468 n.37 (emphasis added).
36. See also Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 723-25 (3rd Cir. 1974).
37. Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973).
38. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215-17 (1971). Allowable penalties include
permitting impeachment by proof of prior convictions, requiring a notice from the defendant
of his alibi defense prior to trial, and refusing the fifth amendment privilege to defendants
being cross-examined concerning matters testified to on direct examination. Id.
39. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973).
40. To satisfy such a test the state must have a legitimate interest in impeaching a
defendant and in advancing the truth seeking process by introduction of post-arrest silence.
41. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 874 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
Doyle majority specifically notes that wide leeway must be given to the
prosecutor during cross-examination.4 2 It is necessary to the truth-seeking
process that all pertinent information be considered.
43
Justice Stevens contended in his dissent that Harris v. New York'
mandated the proposition that the state has a paramount interest in this truth
seeking process. Harris had held that statements elicited from a suspect
following a defective recitation of the Miranda warnings could be used for
impeachment, but not as substantive evidence of guilt, so long as the prior
statement was trustworthy and sharply contrasting with the proffered
testimony.4" The essential concept in Harris, however, is inconsistency,
and in the case of silence this condition is simply not fulfilled. Thus, the
opinions construing silence as inconsistent with a subsequent exculpatory
statement have invoked diverse and vague standards to determine inconsis-
tency-deciding the matter almost a priori.46 When a statement is con-
trasted with a subsequent statement some tangible standard is possible, but
as the Court recognized in United States v. Hale,47 this standard breaks
down with silence in an arrest situation absent Miranda warnings.4 8 Even
with Miranda warnings, however, the silence becomes "insolubly am-
biguous" unless it is probed on cross-examination, a procedure previously
noted to be infirm.
49
Conceding a state's legitimate interest in impeaching a defendant's
testimony at trial, the Doyle majority nevertheless holds that impeachment
of that testimony by use of post-arrest silence following receipt of Miranda
warnings does not advance that interest. This is so because silence under
these circumstances is insolubly ambiguous: it does not assist in the truth
seeking process. Thus the employment of silence for impeachment pur-
poses burdens the exercise of fifth amendment rights with an unconstitu-
tional penalty."0
The Doyle decision dictates uniformity in state and federal courts.
Prosecutors are now constitutionally prohibited from introducing evidence
of post-arrest silence following Miranda warnings to impeach a subse-
quent exculpatory story."' The Court's due process rationale 2 was correct
42. 426 U.S. at 617 n.7.
43. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
44. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Justice Stevens also cited Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494
(1926), as supportive of his rationale, but conceded that Raffel was all but overruled by
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), and Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189
(1943).
45. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,224(1971). The Court spoke in terms of Miranda
not being "perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense." Id. at 226. See also
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869 (1971).
47. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
48. Id. at 179-80.
49. See notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra. As a Fifth Circuit decision upholding
the Harris exception in the case of silence noted, the prior silence must be "much more than
ambiguous." United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1975).
50. See also Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53 (9th Cir. 1969).
51. In the event that such evidence is introduced the state must demonstrate on appeal
that its use was harmless, based on the strict standards of constitutional error. The state in
and ensures that the Miranda warnings have not become merely an "armor
of gauze." 53 It remains, however, for the Court to more fully articulate the
constitutional implications of the decision.
LEGAL ETHICS-CONTINGENT FEES TO EXPERT WITNESSES-Is DIsci-
PLINARY RULE 7-109(C) DEAD? Person v. Association of the Bar of
City of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
In Person v. Association of the Bar,' a portion2 of Disciplinary Rule
7-109(C)3 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility was declared unconstitutional. That portion of the rule pro-
hibits a lawyer from paying-or acquiescing in the payment of-
compensation to a witness contingent on the outcome of the case. In
declaring this prohibition unconstitutional, Person rejects the idea that an
expert witness' compensation becomes improper merely because it is
contingent upon the employing party's success in court. In this respect,
Doyle did not advance this theory. Normally, a constitutional error is harmless if there is no
reasonable possibility that the evidence in question contributed to the conviction. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). Justice Stevens perceived error in the prosecutor's use of
Doyle's silence to imply guilt in his closing argument. He concluded, however, that in the
context of the entire trial the error was harmless. 426 U.S. at 636 (dissenting opinion).
52. Few lower courts had previously considered the issues of due process and funda-
mental fairness in the context of impeachment by post-arrest silence. Further, those courts
that employed the argument generally did so as supportive of their primary analysis based
upon either fifth amendment rights or the lack of probative value of the evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1974), affdsub nom. United States
v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); State v. Griffin, 120 N.J. Super. 13, 17,293 A.2d 217,219(1972).
53. Burko v. State, 19 Md. App. 645, 651, 313 A.2d 864, 868 (1974).
[Casenote by Stanley Yorsz.]
1. 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.1976). The case was part of Person's three-pronged
attack on the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE]. See Person v. Ass'n of the Bar, 414 F. Supp. 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), in which Person
challenged the Code's prohibition against advertising a legal specialty and hourly rate. See
also Person v. Ass'n of the Bar, 414 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
The ABA Code has been adopted in at least 33 states; in others the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics are in effect. See Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession:
Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 77, 78 n.8 (1973). For a general
review, see Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An
Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970).
2. Constitutional infirmity of a part of a statute need not result in failure of the statute
as a whole; by analogy, only the invalid portion of a rule of court need be stricken. On the
criteria for statutory severability, see 2 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§
44.01-20 (1973).
3. ABA CODE, supra note I, Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C) states:
A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation
to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the
case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:
I. Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying.
2. Reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or
testifying.
3. A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
The ABA CODE, supra note 1, is found in N.Y. JUD. LAW app., at 499 (McKinney 1975); it is
incorporated by reference in PA. R. Civ. P. 205.
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then, Person rejects an idea nearly universally accepted in the case law,4 in
court rules,5 and in the commentaries.
6
The plaintiff, an attorney in an antitrust case, maintained that because
of his client's inability to pay expert witness fees and the prohibition of the
disciplinary rule, he was unable to obtain the services and testimony of
economists and accountants needed for his case. The plaintiff showed
further that in his type of practice, this predicament is a recurring one. He
therefore moved for summary declaratory judgment that the rule was
invalid. 7 The district court granted the motion. Insofar as the rule "must
particularly forbid to the less affluent and to the indigent a means of
obtaining an equal hearing" it was held too irrational to survive fourteenth
amendment analysis.
8
Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C) transforms a principle of the common law
into a rule of court for the discipline of lawyers. The common law
condemns any contract between a lawyer and an expert, 9 or a litigant and an
expert, in which the expert's compensation is contingent upon the outcome
of the case' or a percentage of the recovery. 1 Such an agreement is said to
4. See, e.g., Thomas v. Caulkett, 57 Mich. 392, 24 N.W. 154 (1885); Hough v. State,
145 App. Div. 718, 130 N.Y.S. 407 (1911); Griffith v. Harris, 17 Wis. 2d 255, 116 N.W.2d 133
(1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 927 (1963). See also cases cited, notes 10, 11 infra.
5. PA. R. Civ. P. 204 also deals with the specific problem of the lawyer-expert
contract. It states:
No attorney shall promise to pay or shall, directly or indirectly, make payment or
sanction the payment of any compensation . . . to any person in recognition of his
services or connection with any case in addition to the compensation agreed upon
or customarily and reasonably charged for services actually rendered by such
person. The amount of such compensation shall not depend on or be determined,
directly or indirectly, by the outcome of the case.
As PA. R. Civ. P. 204 is broad enough to include lay investigators and experts who help
prepare the case but do not actually testify, it has a wider scope than Disciplinary Rule
7-109(C), which applies only to paid witnesses. 1 GOODRICH-AMRAM, PA. PROCEDURAL RULES
SERVICE WITH FORMS § 204-1, at 14 n. 16 (1967), states, "Preliminary drafts of Rule 204 applied
to payments to 'any physician, medical practitioner or expert witness.' As promulgated by the
supreme court, Rule 204 applies to payments to 'any person."' Thus, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has clearly enunciated its aversion to contingent fee payment to anyone with the
responsibility to produce evidence.
6. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1430 at 379 (1962); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
552(2) (1945); 14 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTONON CONTRACTS § 1716, at 879 (3d ed. 1972); BOMAR,
THE COMPENSATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 510, 520 (1935).
7. "The most commonly used direct remedies for achieving relief from invalid
legislation are declaratory judgments and injunctions against enforcement." I C. SANDS,
supra note 2, § 2.05. Person had attempted to obtain an injunction against Disciplinary Rule
7-109(C) in Person v. Ass'nof the Bar, 414 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976s, but it was ruled that
a declaratory judgment was the more appropriate remedy.
8. 414 F. Supp at 146. It is not clear what fourteenth amendment analysis was used to
support this decision. The court appears to mingle elements of equal protection and of
substantive and procedural due process when it states,
[it] is concluded that to treat contingency of payment as in and of itself improper is
too irrational to survive Fourteenth Amendment analysis. The interest in access to
the courts on a basis of equality may not exact redress of every imbalance that
disparity of means can produce, but it is of such fundamental importance that it
cannot be subjected to a constraint that is not adapted to effective achievement of
its professed goal.
Id. Cf. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the
Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223 (1970).
9. On the validity of expert witness contracts generally, see 31 AM. JUR. 2d Expert &
Opinion Evidence § 10 (1967); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1457 (1922).
10. In re Certain Lands in City of New York, 144 App. Div. 107,128N.Y.S. 999(1911),
aff'd, 204 N.Y. 625, 97 N.E. 1103 (1912); Pollak v. Gregory, 9 Bos. 116 (N.Y. Super. Ct.
1861); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 552(2) (1945).
11. Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130 N.W. 667 (1911); Laffin v. Billington, 86
N.Y.S. 267 (App. Term 1904).
violate public policy as it "smack[s] of champerty and induces perjured
testimony." '2
Champerty, however, can be distinguished from a contingent fee
contract with a witness. Champerty is the investment of money in a
lawsuit, whereas in a contingent fee arrangement only services are in-
vested. For example, in a recent Pennsylvania case, Belfonte v. Miller, 13 it
was held that a contract by which a realtor was to receive a percentage of
the damages in an eminent domain proceeding in exchange for his research
and testimony was not champertous. It was nonetheless voided because the
contingent fee violated public policy against practices that might foster
perjured testimony and thereby interfere with the sound administration of
justice.
Both the common-law rule against contingent fee contracts with
expert witnesses and Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C) are designed to achieve a
policy goal of unperjured or unbiased testimony. Nevertheless, as noted in
Person,
[i]t must be doubted that there is total compliance with the Rule
in its present form. The case in which the unsuccessful personal
injury plaintiff's lawyer goes unpaid must not infrequently be
also the case in which the expert medical witness does not press
either the plaintiff or his lawyer for payment.
14
This being the case, the rule is subject to attack from a constitutional
standpoint as well as from the standpoint of the case law.
The reality to which Person makes indirect reference is that litigants
seek the best witness, not the best scientist. Unless the expert can support
the litigant's position, he will not be called upon to testify.
At one extreme, this has led to the practice of the corrupt
'medical expert' who is prepared to use the labels and language
of expertise as a means of deceiving the trier of fact. Less
extreme is the partisan expert. Under ordinary adversary proce-
dure, the expert employed by a party with the knowledge that he
will be paid by him is more likely to develop a bias . . . and
emphasize deductions and inferences in a way that furthers his
party's case.'5
So it is that expert witnesses have been called "hired champions,'
16
"intellectual soldiers of fortune,'' 17 and "a kind of intellectual prosti-
tute." 8 The enormous fee commanded by an expert has been regarded as
the equivalent of a bribe.' 9 The resulting "battle of the experts" has
12. Bomar, The Compensation of Expert Witness, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBEL. 510,520
(1935),
13. 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 243 A.2d 150 (1968).
14. 414 F. Supp. at 146.
15. Van Dusen, A United States District Judge's View of the Impartial Medical Expert
System, 32 F.R.D. 498, 500 (1963).
16. Molinari, The Role of the Expert Witness, 9 FORUM 789, 791 (1974).
17. Westenhauser, The Expert Witness, 67 ALBANY L.J. 2, 7 (1905).
18. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 247, 247
(1910).
19. Rice, The Medical Expert as Witness, 10 GREEN BAG 464, 466 (1898).
increased dissatisfaction and led to proposals for change in the entire
manner of using expert testimony in civil litigation. The essence of these
proposals is the use of court-appointed experts.20
From a constitutional standpoint the court found that if the rule against
contingent fee contracts with expert witnesses has ever removed an
incentive to untruthful testimony, it has done so "at too great a cost in
fundamental fairness." 2 ' What the rule does accomplish is to keep the less
affluent and indigent individual out of court: he may find an attorney to
take his case on a contingent fee basis, "[b]ut he may not obtain any expert
whom the merits of his case can attract to study it and testify to his
opinion." 22 Thus, the case "falls in the area considered in Boddie v.
Connecticut. "23 Under the Boddie standards, the rule could not withstand
fourteenth amendment attack. It follows, therefore, that if the disciplinary
rule keeps the less affluent out of court, so does the common-law rule on
expert witness contracts; it must also fall under fourteenth amendment
attack.
20. FED. R. EvID. 706 provides that the court may appoint a neutral expert, either on the
motion of a party or on the motion of the judge. It also provides that compensation will be paid
to the expert out of government funds or by the parties in proportions directed by the judge.
While FED. R. EVID. 706 preserves the right of parties to call their own experts, it does not help
a party, who, as in the Person case, cannot afford to retain the services and/or testimony of an
expert for his own use.
The use of court-appointed experts is the essence of other proposals and codifications
that seek to minimize the abuses of expert advocacy. Wigmore suggested that a jury of
experts be used. See 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 563, at 647-48 (3d ed. 1940).
Learned Hand approved this proposal and traced the use of the expert jury back to the
fourteenth century. See Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Te.timony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40-41 (1901).
The first modern codification of impartial expert procedure in civil trials appeared with
the Uniform Expert Testimony Act, approved in 1937 by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and found at 9A U.L.A. 536 (1965). It was approved only in South Dakota; see
S.D. CODE §§ 36.0109-0118 (2 Supp. 1960). MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 403-410 (1942),
not adopted in any state, correspond closely to the provisions of the Uniform Expert
Testimony Act.
The court-appointed expert system is not without critics. One concern is that the
court-appointed critic acquires an aura of infallibility, to which he is not entitled. See Levy,
Impartial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416 (1961).
It is generally agreed that any judge, in state or federal court, has inherent power to call
expert witnesses on his motion without the need of an enabling statute. See 9 J. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2484, at 267-70 (3d ed. 1940); Note, The Trial Judge's Use of His
Power to Call Witnesses, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 761 (1957); Note, Judicial Authority to Call
Expert Witnesses, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 375 (1957); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 390 (1964).
21. Person v. Ass'n of the Bar, 414 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. N.Y. 1976).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 145. The court reasons in Person that two kinds of interests are affected by
Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C): the lawyer's and the client's. The lawyer has an interest in being
able to pursue his client's case freely, and the client has an interest in having his case heard.
Since the second interest depends upon the first, it is more drastically affected by the rule.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), required the state to develop a procedure
whereby indigent plaintiffs could commence a divorce action without having to pay the fees,
and costs. The Court said it was a denial of due process to impose fees that effectively denied
the poor access to the courts. At one time it was thought that Boddie foreshadowed a general
right of access to the courts for indigents. The Court's decisions in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656 (1973), and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), ended such speculation as
they showed that Boddie was to be applied only in limited situations. Nevertheless, the
question of access is still open. See Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court Access for
Indigents After Kras and Ortwein 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571 (1973).
Person can be distinguished from Boddie, however. First, Person, which prohibits state
action, effects increased access to the courts by a different means than Boddie, which
requires state action. Person deals with the freedom to contract. Second, Person affects the
rights of a broader class of people, as it includes the "less affluent and indigent. " 414 F. Supp.
at 146. Boddie is limited to the indigent.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that discussion in Person
focuses on the reasoning used in the common law. Person cites Barnes v.
Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis ,24 for example, as one of the few
cases to uphold the conclusion that a contingent fee payment is not in and of
itself improper. 25 In Barnes, the court affirmed the right of a psychiatrist to
collect his contingent fee for services and testimony rendered as an expert.
They noted:
[There is nothing] in the evidence tending to show that the
respondent's testimony and advice was [sic] not his honest
opinion. . . . [W]e are not at liberty to draw the inference that
respondent's testimony was false because his fee was contingent
upon the success of the litigation. If we did so, we would be
compelled to infer that a party litigant's testimony was false
because he is interested in the outcome of his litigation. We
would also have to infer that all witnesses were guilty of perjury
who were produced by an attorney trying a case on a contingent
fee basis.
2 6
There are other cases, however, indirectly supporting Person, that
uphold contingent fee compensation in a contract with an expert or
investigator employed only to produce evidence for litigation, but not to
testify. 27 In this kind of contract the temptation to produce fabricated
evidence or to suppress damaging evidence does not render a contract
invalid; rather, it takes an invalid provision, such as a promise to produce
evidence of a certain content, to do so.28 There is no logical reason,
therefore, to apply a special prohibition to the employee expert who
contracts to produce evidence and also to testify. In both types of contracts
there is a temptation to falsify evidence, be it testimonial or documentary.
24. 248 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941). Barnes is cited in a case ancillary to that
discussed in this note. Person v. Ass'n of the Bar, 414 F. Supp. 139, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
25.Cf. language in Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 107 F. Supp. 326,
344 (N.D. Ill. 1952), aff'd, 207 F. 2d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 1953).
26. Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 248 Mo. 1032, 1038, 156 S.W.2d 597,602 (1911).
Barnes emphasizes that the parties who contracted on a contingent fee basis were not guilty of
misconduct. Nevertheless, in Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 243 A.2d 150 (1968),
the court voided the contract even though it noted that the parties had behaved in an
exemplary fashion.
27. Haley v, Hollenback, 53 Mont. 494, 165 P. 459 (1917); Singer Mfg. Co. v. City Nat'l
Bank, 145 N.C. 319, 59 S.E. 72 (1907); Miller v. Anderson, 183 Wis. 163,196 N.W. 869(1924).
28. See Griffith v. Harris, 17 Wis. 2d 255, 116 N.W. 2d 133 (1962), in which plaintiff
sued defendant for damages for breach of his promise to appear in court and give testimony
favorable to plaintiff. The contract was void as against public policy. The Person court
accepts the proposition that one cannot bargain for testimony of a certain content, and to the
extent excessive fees will affect the content of the testimony, they should be limited. Thus,
the court stated that expert witness fees should be kept reasonable in amount, defined as "an
amount related to time spent, difficulty of the problem, inconvenience imposed. . . and such
factors .... " 414 F. Supp. at 146.
Courts rarely regulate fees paid to witnesses. See, e.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. United
Eng'r & Foundry Co., 83 F. Supp. 914 (W.D. Pa. 1938), wherein it was held that a litigant may
properly pay "substantial sums" for expert testimony. See also Dureff's Estate, 64 Pa. D &
C.2d 650 (C.P. Phila. 1973) (finding payment of over $1000 proper).
Person passes judgment on whether a reasonable fee is made unreasonable if it is not paid
in all circumstances. The court notes, "It is not meant to suggest that in the case of the expert a
fee measured as a percentage of the recovery might not generally or in particular cases be
regarded as per se unreasonable." 414 F. Supp. at 146. An unreported case, Pluvinage v.
Cummings, CA No. 2264-71 (D.D.C. order of Oct. 21, 1974) (Corcoran, J.), held that a
medical-legal corporation was permitted to receive a percentage in a malpractice suit as long
as the percentage requested was reasonable. The percentage requested in the contract was ten
percent of the ultimate verdict.
If the temptation to falsify evidence is insufficient to invalidate one
category of contracts, it should be insufficient as to the other.
While the precise issue in Person is Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C), it
seems clear that the decision, if followed elsewhere, will do more than
simply free lawyers from the threat of disbarment.29 The decision would
also require courts to honor and enforce contingent fee agreements between
litigants and expert witnesses. The effect of such a result could be to
increase civil litigation. Personal injury suits comprise the majority of civil
suits, 30 but, as Person notes, experts are essential in many other areas of
the law as well: "malpractice cases against practitioners in various
professional fields, product liability cases involving questions of design,
malfunction and defect, patent and copyright cases, desegregation cases,
obscenity control cases .... ,"31 Moreover, with the ability to contract
freely for expert services, more private suits in the public interest might be
encouraged under the private attorney general theory. 32 Although Person
required experts for his antitrust suit, certain other federal and state laws
seek to encourage citizen participation in enforcement. The Clean Air Act
of 1970,'3 for example, and Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Control Act ,3
provide that a successful litigant can collect both attorney's and expert's
fees.3 5 These acts recognize that the expert's services are as essential as the
attorney's when litigating a highly technical case. Person, however, would
take these statutes one step further in encouraging the citizen to bring suit.
It is no help to recover fees, if successful, if one cannot contract with the
expert at the onset of litigation.
With scant support from the case law, and opposition from the
commentators, Person strikes out into new territory by invalidating the
long-standing prohibition against contingent fee contracts with expert
witnesses. No less a tour de force is the fact that Person considers a rule
29. Sanctions against contingent fee contracts with experts have been strong. Courts
have refused to uphold such a contract against a defaulting party despite the fact that a service
has been rendered. Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 243 A.2d 150 (1968). An
attorney was disbarred, not on the basis of a court rule violtion but on the basis of violation of
the common law, for negotiating such a contract. In re Schapiro, 144 App. Div. 1,128 N.Y.S.
852 (1911). One court has gone so far as to recommend investigation for the purpose of
prosecuting a physician who had collected a fee that was a percentage of the plaintiff's
recovery. Davis v. Smoot, 176 N.C. 538, 97 S.E. 488 (1918).
30. According to the Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1963, at I, col. 1, eighty percent
of civil jury cases in the United States are personal injury cases and the majority of them turn
on medical questions.
31. 414 F. Supp at 146.
32. The concept of the private attorney general was suggested by Jerome Frank in
Associated Indus. v Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). Under the private attorney general
theory a private plaintiff can litigate a question of public interest, to enforce environmental
legislation for example, with the result that attorney's fees can be recovered. See also,
Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A
Comparative Study, 73 MicH. L. REV. 794 (1975); Homburger, Private Suits in the Public
Interest in the United States ofAmerica, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343, 385-405 (1974); Steinberg,
Is the Citizen Suit a Substitute for Class Action in Environmental Litigation ?An Examination
of the Clean Air Act of 1970 Citizen Suit Provision, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 107 (1974).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1858a (1970).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-4015 (Purdon 1964).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (d) (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4010 (f) (Purdon Supp.
1976-77).
designed for attorney discipline and finds it violative of the Constitution
because it unreasonably denies indigent and less affluent litigants access to
the courts. The court redresses that wrong simply. Irrespective of the
treatment Person receives in subsequent cases, it forces reexamination of
how the important policy goal of unbiased, unperjured expert testimony
may be achieved.
[Casenote by M. Hannah Leavitt.
CRIMINAL LAW-RENEWAL OF INTERROGATION AFTER ASSERTION OF
THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. Commonwealth v. Reiland, - Pa.
Super. Ct. -, 359 A.2d 811 (1976).
A majority1 of the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in Common-
wealth v. Reiland2 that under certain circumstances a confession obtained
after a suspect has been advised of his constitutional rights, as prescribed
by Miranda v. Arizona,3 and has exercised his right to remain silent, may
be admissible against him at trial. 4 The ruling broadens the power of the
police to seek a waiver by a suspect in custody of his constitutional right to
remain silent.' The court adopted the test of "whether [the suspect's] 'right
to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored' " during interroga-
tion,6 a test employed by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley.
7
Gaged against this standard, police procedure that included immediate
cessation of questioning after assertion of constitutional rights and com-
plete warnings prior to requestioning was held to comply with constitution-
al mandates.
8
Richard Keith Reiland was arrested at his home for burglary, was
orally given Miranda warnings, and was asked a follow-up question.
1. Six judges joined the majority opinion, while Judge'Spaeth concurred.
2. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 359 A.2d 811 (1976).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Briefly stated, the landmark Miranda decision provided a set
of guidelines aimed at eliminating the physical and psychological coercion inherent in
custodial interrogation. To protect the individual's privilege against self-incrimination, the
Court required clear warnings, prior to interrogation, that a suspect has the right to remain
silent, any statement may be used as evidence against him, and he has a right to consult with an
attorney, retained or appointed if he is indigent. Any waiver of these rights must be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent. If all of these rights are not explained, the confession is presumed the
product of coercion and is inadmissible in court as evidence. Id. at 444-45. Miranda was
expressly adopted as controlling in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 423 Pa. 432,
224 A.2d 625 (1966).
4. - Pa. Super. Ct. at-, 359 A.2d at 814.
5. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
6. - Pa. Super. Ct. at-, 359 A.2d at 814.
7. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
8. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 814. Because Reiland was given Miranda
warnings on three occasions, twice prior to interrogation sessions and once again when a tape
was made subsequent to his confession, the superior court held that his rights were
scrupulously honored. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 814. The court noted that had the statement been
taken in the absence of counsel after a request for counsel, then the statement would have
been suppressed. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 813. See note 51 infra.
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Upon his refusal to respond he was transported to police headquarters.
Questioning, which resulted in an incriminatory statement, was resumed
following new warnings within twenty minutes of his original refusal. 9
When the trial court denied his motion to suppress the statement and
additional incriminating evidence, Reiland entered a plea of guilty. On
appeal'" he maintained that his plea was involuntarily entered because it
was motivated in part by a confession obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights." The court rejected this contention, finding the
police conduct lawful in the light of Mosley and holding, therefore, that his
plea was voluntary. 12
Reiland based his contention upon the following statement in
Miranda:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure
is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any state-
ment taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other
than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the
right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interroga-
tion operates on the individual to overcome free choice in
producing a statement after the privilege has been once
invoked. 3
Miranda clearly foreclosed any further attempt to obtain information
immediately after assertion of the right to silence, but failed to clarify the
issue of whether and when interrogation may be renewed in the event an
individual chooses to remain silent but does not request counsel. 14 A
restrictive reading of this passage would preclude further questioning in the
9. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 815. The arrest and initial warnings occurred at
approximately 4:05 a.m. and questioning was resumed at approximately 4:25 a.m. by a
different set of officers. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 815.
10. Appeal was taken pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, 19 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 1180-1 to -14 (Supp. 1976-77). A petition filed pursuant to the Act was dismissed without a
hearing. Subsequently an appeal asking that the case be remanded for an evidentiary hearing
was granted per curiam. The superior court heard the present case on appeal from denial of
post-verdict motions granted after the evidentiary hearing.
I1. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 812-13. Appellant's contention was that his plea
was motivated by physical evidence seized during a warrantless search of his bedroom with
the consent of his mother and by a confession obtained in the absence of counsel after a
request for counsel. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 813. The court ruled that the mother's consent was
both authorized and voluntary and there was no evidence of a request for counsel. Id. at -,
359 A.2d at 813-14. They then proceeded to discuss whether a confession obtained after an
expressed desire for silence was admissible.
12. Id. at -, 359 A. 2d at 814. In order to collaterally attack a guilty plea in
Pennsylvania, an appellant must demonstrate:
(I) an involuntary pre-trial confession (or presumably any other constitutionally
infirm incriminating evidence); (2) that the guilty plea was primarily motivated by
such evidence; and, (3) that defendent was incompetently advised by counsel to
plead guilty, in the circumstances, rather than stand trial.
Commonwealth v. March, 440 Pa. 590, 593, 271 A.2d 481, 483 (1970). Accord, Common-
wealth v. Reiland, -Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 359 A.2d 811,813 (1976). The superior court did not
discuss the second and third components of the test, ruling the first prerequisite had not been
met. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 815.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) (footnote omitted).
14. Miranda provided that interrogation must cease after a request for assistance of
counsel until an attorney is present. Id. at 474-75.
absence of a lawyer on the assumption that the pressures of a custodial
setting may produce a waiver that is the product of subtle coercion. 15 Only
two states follow this strict interpretation, providing that only the suspect
may reinitiate discussion of the crime.'
6
Most states, concerned with the effectiveness of police activity, have
adopted less stringent standards of admissibility, focusing either upon the
voluntary nature of the waiver or the conduct of the officers who secure the
admission. States adopting the "voluntary waiver" approach maintain that
the prosecution must prove a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver
prior to reinterrogation as a predicate to the admissibility of statements
obtained thereby. This burden has generally been sustained by showing a
lack of coercion, force, or intimidation-usually in conjunction with a
significant period of time-and repetition of full Miranda warnings. 17
Other "voluntary waiver" jurisdictions, including the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, 18 seek additional evidence to substantiate allegations of a
voluntary change of mind.' 9 Under the "police conduct" approach, by
contrast, a waiver following new warnings is presumed voluntary, absent
evidence of coercion, if the police have met a certain standard of conduct-
specifically, if they have refrained from further questioning at that time. 20
Under this test investigators are conceded the privilege of asking a suspect
15. The American Law Institute recommended that police be precluded from seeking a
waiver without the presence of a lawyer after the assertion of any right:
[E]ven a seemingly voluntary waiver given after a person has once indicated he
does not wish to cooperate may be the product of subtle coercion; the very passage
of time while a person continues to be in police detention will create fears and
pressures undermining the will to insist on one's right to silence . . . .The court's
language in Miranda seems to be consistent with this view.
ALl MODEL CODE OF PRF-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(2)(d), Comment at 52 (1975).
16. State v. Kroupa, 16 Ariz. App. 254, 492 P.2d 750 (1972); People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.
2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
17. People v. Pittman, 55 I1. 2d 39, 302 N.E.2d 7 (1973) (twenty-four hours elapsed
between questioning sessions); Conway v. State, 7 Md. App. 400,256 A.2d 178 (1969) (sixteen
hours elapsed before requestioning). Cases not requiring lapse of a "significant period of
time" relied heavily on the defendant's right to change his mind. See, e.g., State v. Robinson,
87 S.D. 375, 209 N.W.2d 374 (1973) (fifteen minutes); State v. McClelland, 164 N.W.2d 189
(Iowa 1969) (thirty minutes).
18. United States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1975). During the first
interrogation session, the defendant was in the hospital, badly wounded, and did not
acknowledge the presence of the officer, who gave no warnings and asked no questions. A
statement was obtained the following day after warnings were given. The court said the length
of time belied a finding of a voluntary change of mind, but warned that "[i]n some
circumstances . . . prior assertion of Miranda rights may render inadmissible a subsequent
confession, particularly when interrogation continues after refusal by the suspect to speak
. . .or is resumed shortly thereafter." Id. at 467 (citations omitted).
19. Hill v. Whealon, 490 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendant knew that when he refused
to answer police would ask no further questions); State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217
N.W.2d 359 (1974) (voluntary statement by defendant); State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158
S.E.2d 511 (1968) (all defendants were offered counsel prior to next interrogation session)-
20. The primary consideration of the courts using this approach is whether "police
refuse to take no for an answer." E.g., Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512,515 (5th Cir.
1968). Accord, People v. Naranjo, 181 Colo. 273, -, 509 P.2d 1235, 1237 (1973). While the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court tends to utilize the "police conduct" approach, itcircumscribes
the power of law officers to seek atwaiver. Prior to Reiland the only supreme court case
dealing specifically with reinterrogation after a suspect invokes his right to silence was
Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972). In that case, ten hours after
the suspect's initial refusal to speak, police discovered additional unrelated charges pending,
and the confession subsequently obtained from renewed questioning was admissible at trial.
The discovery of the unrelated crime justified additional interrogation because it constituted a
"substantial change in circumstances." Id. at 234, 296 A.2d at 731.
to reconsider his refusal2 and, in some jurisdictions, there is no limit to the
number of interrogation sessions.
22
The United States Supreme Court had occasion to review these
diverse standards when, in 1975, it granted certiorari for review of People
v. Mosley .23 In that case the Michigan Court of Appeals held that after an
election to remain silent any statement that was the product of reinterroga-
tion was barred by Miranda .24 The Supreme Court's opinion, however,
rejected the proposition that Miranda "created a per se proscription on
questioning of infinite duration," reasoning that such a rule would estab-
lish irrational barriers to legitimate police investigation and deprive a
suspect of any information about his legal position. 2 5 Without commenting
on the merits of lower court decisions, the majority identified as the critical
factor in determining admissibility whether police "scrupulously honor"
the "right to cut off questioning. 26 The safeguards present in Mosley-
immediate discontinuation of the initial interrogation, passage of a "signif-
icant period of time," thorough rewarning by a different police officer, and
concentration on an unrelated crime-satisfied this standard. 27 In approv-
ing police conduct in this instance,28 the Court reasoned that compliance
with a suspect's request to terminate questioning counteracts the coercive
pressures of the interrogation setting by giving him control over the
substance and duration of questioning. Furthermore, questioning regard-
ing a different crime does not undercut a previous decision to remain
silent.
29
The practical effect of the Court's use of such broad language to
sanction investigatory procedures in the unique situation Mosley posed,
without providing further guidelines, was to create a vague test susceptible
21. Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. O'Neill, 299 Minn.
60, 216 N.W.2d 822 (1974). In O'Neill, police urging was considered appropriate when a
suspect was not fully cognizant of his situation, as long as it was not compulsive in any way.
22. United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendant was warned and
questioned six times, the last three sessions within one hour); United States v. Brady, 421
F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1970) (five times); People v. Naranjo, 181 Colo. 273, 509 P.2d 1235 (1973)
(three times). Contra, State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438 (1968).
23. 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564 (1974).
24. The Michigan court held that shifting a suspect to a different interrogator could not
justify a subsequent interrogation.
25. 423 U.S. 96, 102 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 104. The Court split 6-2. Justice Brennan's dissent criticized the rule for its
ambiguity and continued erosion of the Miranda principles. Id. at 112.
27. Id. at 106. Mosley was not questioned for over two hours after his initial refusal to
speak.
28. The issue was confined exclusively to "whether the conduct of the Detroit police
that led to Mosley's incriminating statement did, in fact, violate the Miranda 'guidelines,' so
as to render the statement inadmissible . . . at his trial." Id. at 100.
29. Id. at 105. The court's reasoning has been criticized as rejection of the fundamental
principle of Miranda that
inherent coercion is always present in a custodial atmosphere. . . .As evidence of
this 'counteraction,' the Court cited the more than two hour delay between
interrogations. But under Miranda, this delay would be characterized as part of the
custodial atmosphere that cannot help but wear down the accused's will to resist.
Similarly the fact that a different police officer conducted each interrogation and
that different subjects were discussed at each could also be cited as evidence of
inherent coercion.
54 N.C.L. REV. 625, 703 (1976).
to inconsistent interpretations.30 Thus, in the months following the deci-
sion, Mosley was cited both to condemn and to condone police practices
such as immediate follow-up inquiries after an election to remain silent,3 1
questioning about the same crime after a considerable lapse of time, 32 and
interrogation concerning the same subject after a relatively brief period of
time.33 An examination of which aspect of Mosley each court chose to
emphasize demonstrates how easily contradictory conclusions can be
based on one case. Decisions placing more restrictions on police activity
relied heavily on factual distinctions and the Court's analysis of the facts,
34
while cases that echoed Mosley's unqualified rejection of a per se ban on
all further interrogation downplayed or omitted the facts.3"
In Reiland the superior court exhibited the same tendency to ignore
the Court's reasoning upon the unique facts of Mosley as had the more
permissive jurisdictions. Without examining the factual differences be-
tween the cases, it ruled that admissibility was contingent upon police
honoring a suspect's right to cut off questioning, concluding that im-
mediate cessation of questioning and new Miranda warnings satisfied this
requirement. 36 In particular, the court ignored two factors considered
significant in Mosley-a lapse of two hours between interrogation ses-
sions37 and questioning about an unrelated crime-factors that were
modified or nonexistent in Reiland.3' Furthermore, in Mosley, the Su-
preme Court had implied that interrogation concerning the same crime
could coercively undermine the will of an accused in holding to his
previous decision to remain silent; 39 yet the superior court failed to even
consider the possibility of coercion. By dispensing with the safeguards
30. 54 N.C.L. REV. 625, 703 (1976).
31. Compare Hearne v. State, 534 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (confession
inadmissible when questioning did not cease), and State v. Sauve, 112 Ariz. 576, 544 P.2d
1091 (1976) (confession inadmissible when defendant was shown additional evidence im-
mediately after he refused to speak), with United States v. Davis, 527 F. 2d 1110 (9th Cir.
1975) (confession admissible when police immediately showed new evidence and urged
reconsideration), and Taylor v. Riddle, 409 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Va. 1976) (confession
admitted when police made a gentle probe, asking about other evidence).
32. Compare United States v. Olaf. 527 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975) (confession suppressed
when object of second session was to make suspect change his mind three hours later), with
State v. Robbins, 15 Wash. App. 108, 547 P.2d 288 (1976) (confession upheld when sessions
were separated by two days).
33. Compare United States v. Clayton, 407 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (confession
inadmissible when suspect questioned twice within one hour), with Commonwealth v.
Reiland, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 359 A.2d 811 (1976) (confession upheld when sessions were
twenty minutes apart).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Clayton, 407 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Wis. 1976); State v.
Sauve, 112 Ariz. 576, 544 P.2d 1091 (1976).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. McDonald,
195 Neb. 625, 240 N.W.2d 8 (1976).
36. Commonwealth v. Reiland, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 359 A.2d 811, 814 (1976).
37. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106 (1975). While the Mosley court does not
explain the basis of the requirement of a significant period of time, lower courts cited the
length of time to illustrate that the defendant was not under continuous pressure to confess,
People v. Pittman, 55 I1. 2d 39, 302 N.E.2d 7 (1973), or that the suspect had time to reflect,
discuss his options with others and change his mind, State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217
N.W.2d 359. (1974).
38. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 816. In Reiland questioning was suspended for
only twenty minutes and concerned the same subject.
39. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
provided by suspension of questioning for a "significant period of time"
regarding an unrelated crime, the decision clearly extends the Mosley
rule. 40
This extension could be explained by the inapplicability of tests
previously developed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in similar
situations, 4 the lack of evidence or allegation that the statement was in any
way traditionally involuntary, 42 and the "equivocal" nature of Reiland's
original assertion of silence.4 3 The court was reluctant to exclude the
statement as probative evidence when it considered his original election to
remain silent debatable. Caught between the logical view that a completely
voluntary confession should be admissible and Miranda's dictates that any
statement must be excluded unless a procedure designed to protect crimi-
nals against coercion is meticulously followed, the court chose to extend
the test to encompass a different set of circumstances, seemingly satisfying
both goals.
Because of the variance between the facts in the two cases the superior
court was not bound to adopt the Mosley test,' but, having decided to do
so, should have suppressed the confession.45 This conclusion would be
consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of Miran-
da v. Arizona' in Commonwealth v. Grandison .17 In Grandison the court
approved police-initiated interrogation regarding an unrelated crime but
stated in dictum that "there is no question that . . . a refusal to answer
questions . . . precluded further questioning at that time concerning [the
40. Commonwealth v. Reiland, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 359 A.2d 811, 816 (1976)
(Spaeth, J., concurring).
41. Although the majority did not appear to consider them, the only supreme court
cases that considered when police may renew interrogation provided rules that were too
narrow to cover Reiland. See note 20 supra; note 51 and accompanying text infra.
42. Commonwealth v. Reiland, -Pa. Super. Ct. -,-, 359 A.2d 811,813 (1976). The
traditional test of voluntariness focuses on the capacity and willingness of the suspect to make
a confession: "llf a defendant's mind and will are confused or burdened by promises of
advantage, threats, physical or psychologcial abuse, or other improper influences any
statement which he then makes is involuntary." Murphy, Proposed Standard Instructions on
Confessions and Admissions, 75 DICK. L. Rav. 560, 565 (1971). Under these guidelines
Reiland's confession would probably be admissible. Nevertheless, Miranda added other
prerequisites for admissibility. See note 3 supra.
43. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 359 A.2d 811, 813 (1976). The police read him his rights
from a card and asked the follow-up question, "Having these rights in mind, do you wish to
talk to us now?" Reiland's response, according to the testimony of the arresting officer, was
difficult to interpret. " '[H]e sort of didn't want to say anything, like he did, but not right
there.' "- Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 813. The superior court characterized his answer
as "equivocal," ostensibly basing its decision on the assumption that this response was an
assertion of the right to silence. This is consistent with Miranda's ruling that an individual
who indicates in any manner an unwillingness to speak invokes his right to remain silent.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966); accord, State v. O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 216
N.W.2d 822 (1974). The Reiland court, however, continued to view his assertion as tentative:
"Assuming appellant's initial equivocation at the time of arrest to be a desire to remain silent,
his subsequent confession was nevertheless admissible pursuant to the standards set forth in
Mosley." - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 814.
44, The Mosley case was so limited to its own facts that it need not be adopted in
dissimilar situations. See, e.g., Pulliam v. State, 236 Ga. 460, 224 S.E.2d 8 (1976) (Miranda
test applied); State v. Stewart, 325 So. 2d 819 (La. 1976) (applying traditional voluntariness
test). See note 28 supra.
45. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text infra.
46. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47. 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972).
original] subject." 4 8 This statement, considered in conjunction with Mos-
ley's requirement of a "significant" lapse of time, 49 suggests a Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court interpretation that resumption of questioning about
the same crime within a relatively short period of time will not adequately
protect an individual's right to remain silent. 50 Thus, in Reiland, mere
forbearance from questioning for a twenty-minute period solely for the
purpose of transportation and processing is not consistent with the Supreme
Court's goal of protecting the rights of suspects in custody through strict
adherence to Miranda procedures-even at the expense of suppressing an
unquestionably voluntary confession."' Therefore, if the court chose to
adopt Mosley, it should also have provided some guidance for its applica-
tion to avoid future problems of interpretation-for example, allowing
questioning only after passage of a "significant period" of time52 and for
limited purposes. These purposes may include explaining newly discov-
ered evidence 53 or changed circumstances, 54 questioning regarding a
different incident, 55 and ascertaining whether an individual has voluntarily
changed his mind.
5 6
48. Id. at 234, 296 A.2d at 731. See note 20 supra.
49. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106(1975). Justice White interpreted the majority
opinion as requiring cessation of questioning for an unspecified length of time; otherwise, the
confession is to be excluded automatically. Id. at 107.
50. For example, on facts strikingly similar to those of Reiland, it was ruled that a
confession obtained by reinterrogation resumed wtihin an hour after invocation of fifth
amendment rights was inadmissible. The court held that Miranda as construed in Mosley
"mandates that 'interrogation must cease' at least with respect to the same crime and the
same interrogating officer for a substantial period of time." United States v. Clayton, 407 F.
Supp. 204, 207 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (emphasis in original). Questioning resumed "as a practical
matter" when defendant was transported to another building, processed and readvised; thus
"defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent was not accorded the respect it was due
by the interrogating officer." Id.
51. Although in Reiland the entire superior court indicated that Reiland's confession
was correctly ruled admissible, the majority, citing Miranda, noted that had he instead
requested a lawyer and had his subsequent statement been obtained in absence of counsel,
"then the confession should clearly have been suppressed." Commonwealth v. Reiland, -
Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 359 A.2d 811, 813 (1976). Miranda provided that interrogation must
cease, following a request for an attorney, until counsel is present, but did not preclude a
subsequent waiver of this right, if it was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474-75 (1966). Because of this mandate the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court carefully scrutinized the circumstances surrounding confession after a
previous request for a lawyer, holding that police may seek a waiver when justified by a
"'changed situation." Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1,281 A.2d 852 (1971) (death of
victim ten days later made the crime more serious). While a voluntary reversal of position by a
suspect was generally sufficient to sustain the Commonwealth's heavy burden of proving a
waiver, Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970); Commonwealth v. Leaming, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d
590 (1968), the supreme court, in one instance, supressed a defendant-initiated confession.
Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973). In that case after several
hours of custody, a fifteen year old youth sent his sister to contact an attorney and within five
minutes proceeded to confess. The court recommended further inquiry into the individual's
understanding of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation and one factor considered in
reaching this conclusion was the brief period of time separating his request for and waiver of
the right to counsel. Id. at 234, 307 A.2d at 927.
52. Determination of the minimal length of the period between questionings could best
be solved by examining on a case by case basis whether the suspect was in constant police
company or had time to reflect, to consult with others, and to make a voluntary and intelligent
choice. See note 37 supra.
53. State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438 (1968).
54. Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1, 281 A.2d 852 (1971).
55. Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972).
56. United States v. Jackson, 436 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1970).
Adoption of the vague Mosley test with the liberal interpretation
given it by the superior court may result in the admission of confessions in
circumstances more coercive than in Reiland, 7 since all that is necessary
to prove a waiver is to show immediate cessation of questioning and new
warnings. 58 For example, after an initial suspension of interrogation,
police may resume questioning at will with no caveat that the new session
serve a limited purpose.5 9 A suspect who is subjected to additional
interrogation shortly after a prior refusal that deals with the same subject
and injects no new considerations may justly feel that his examiners do not
respect his wishes and decide to cooperate because it would be futile to
resist.60 Moreover, Reiland places no limit on the number of times police
may seek a waiver. Provision for new warnings coupled with the compul-
sion many feel to confess 61 is poor protection against the subtle coercion of
repeated attempts to solicit admissions. 62 When a confession obtained
under these circumstances is challenged, the trial court will determine if the
"right to cut off questioning" was "scrupulously honored." Because
Reiland's only prerequisites for admissibility are cessation of questioning
and new warnings, a finding of these elements will be difficult to
overturn. 63
By abolishing any requirement that the subject voluntarily reverse his
position or that only in changed circumstances may police approach a
subject, Reiland greatly expands the power of the police to seek a
constitutional waiver. Thus the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings
may be diminshed: although suspects must be told of their rights during
57. 54 N.C. L. REV. 625, 704(1976). Reiland has not been appealed, so the decision will
provide a liberal precedent to the trial courts.
58. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
59. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
60. The suspect arrested and brought downtown for questioning is in a crisis-
laden situation. The stakes for him are high-often his freedom for a few or many
years-and his prospects hinge on decisions that must be quickly made ....
Unless he is a professional, the suspect is unlikely to know . . . [t]he likely
consequences of the alternatives open to him[,] . . . how much leniency co-
operation may earn [and] . . . how much a steadfast refusal to talk may contribute
to a decision by the police, prosecutor or judge to 'throw the book' at him.
Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1613-14 (1967).
61. One commentator in assessing the social and psychological pressures in an interro-
gation situation noted that "men have a 'compulsive, unconscious tendency to confess' "and
that "the urge to talk is almost certainly intensified by the host of fears generated by the
interrogation situation." Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82
HARV. L. REV. 42, 57 (1968).
In Miranda the Supreme Court condemned as psychologically coercive a technique in
which police temporarily concede to the accused the right to remain silent, knowing that it has
an undermining effect because the suspect feels the disapproval of the interrogator, and then
pointing out the incriminating significance of the individual's silence. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 453-54 (1966). Requestioning without a change in circumstances in fifteen or twenty
minutes may have the same effect, despite a new warning. Cf. Commonwealth v. Franklin,
438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970) (Pomeroy & Cohen, JJ., dissenting).
62. "It is... unrealistic to assume that a Miranda warning will minimize the coercive
atmosphere, since the notification requirement can be satisfied (and probably often is) by
mere mechanical recitation of the accused's rights." Note, Confessions by the Accused-
Does Miranda Relate to Reality?, 62 Ky. L.J. 794, 808 (1974).
63. Commonwealth v. Williams, 447 Pa. 206, 290 A.2d 111 (1972) (appellate courts must
accept as binding all evidence favorable to the verdict winner).
questioning, by court-approved police procedures they may subtly be
denied the opportunity to exercise them.
64
CRIMINAL LAW-QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT
INFERENCE OF INTENT TO DELIVER HEROIN. Commonwealth v. Har-
ris, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 359 A.2d 407 (1976).
In Commonwealth v. Harris' a divided Pennsylvania Superior Court
2
delineated the quantity of evidence required to support an inference of
intent to deliver a possessed controlled substance, heroin. Expressly
following the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Santiago,3 the court held that
under the proper facts and circumstances 4 mere evidence of possession of a
sufficient quantity of a controlled substance will permit an inference of
intent to deliver. 5 Harris extends the prior holding in Commonwealth v.
Hill6 by permitting expert opinion testimony alone to supply "sufficient
other facts to support the inference" of intent to deliver.7
Following a non-jury trial, Carl T. Harris was convicted of possession
of a controlled substance8 and of possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance. 9 Evidence had been introduced showing Harris to
have been in possession of sixteen "half-spoons" of heroin (approximate-
ly eighty grams).' The arresting officer, testifying as an expert on
narcotics matters, stated that this amount was more than would be
possessed by an addict for personal use. 11 On appeal Harris challenged this
evidence as insufficient to support a conviction for possession with intent
to deliver. The court found this contention to be without merit and
affirmed. 12
In reaching the conclusion that Harris was covered by Common-
wealth v. Santiago 13 the court dismissed considerable factual differences
64. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970) (dissent).
[Casenote by Barbara L. Romberger.]
I. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 359 A.2d 407 (1976).
2. The court divided five to two. Judges Watkins, Jacobs, Price, Van der Voort and
Cercone were in the majority; Judge Hoffman was joined by Judge Spaeth in dissent.
3. 462 Pa. 216, 340 A.2d 440 (1975).
4. See notes 28, 56 and accompanying text infra.
5. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 408.
6. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 572, 346 A.2d 314 (1975). Hill affirmed a conviction for
"trafficking" in narcotics under the former Pennsylvania Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
The court held, inter alia, that evidence of a specific sale or attempted sale of narcotics was
unnecessary if there was a sufficient quantity of narcotics, coupled with other factors
present.
7. - Pa. Super. Ct. at - n.3, 359 A.2d at 408 n.3.
8. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a) (16) (Purdon Supp. 1976).
9. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (a) (30) (Purdon Supp. 1976).
10. - Pa. Super. Ct. at - n.l, 359 A.2d at 410 n.1.
I. Id. at -,359 A.2d at 410.
12. Id. at-, 359 A.2d at 410.
13. 462 Pa. 216, 340 A.2d 440 (1975). Santiago relied heavily on federal precedent. See,
e.g., United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d
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between the two cases. 14 Santiago had held that possession of a sufficient
quantity of a drug, under the proper facts and circumstances, will permit
the inference that the possessor had the requisite intent to deliver the
drug. 15 The validity of the inference of intent to distribute depends on the
amount of narcotics in his possession: 16
The 'intent' with which a controlled substance is possessed
is generally established through circumstantial evidence and in
this regard we have held that the quantity of the drug possessed is
a circumstance which may permit the inference that the posses-
sor had an intent to sell, deliver or otherwise distribute ....
The statute clearly, and without vagueness, makes unlawful the
possession of any controlled substance with an intent to distri-
bute. The question as to the quantity which would permit the
inference that the possessor had an intent to [deliver] is eviden-
tiary in nature and necessarily depends on all the facts and
circumstances of the case at hand, and mention thereof in the
statute is entirely unnecessary.7
In Santiago the vast cache of drugs and drug paraphernalia that were
seized provided a surfeit of evidence to allow the jury to convict for
possession with intent to deliver.' 8 The issue of the minimum quantum of
evidence necessary to permit the inference of intent to deliver, however,
surfaced for the first time in Commonwealth v. Wright, 19 a recent case
inexplicably unmentioned in the Harris opinion.2 °
1035 (5th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37(8th Cir. 1973) (defendant's
possession of 199.73 grams of very pure cocaine worth $200,000 while in interstate travel by
commercial airline was sufficient to justify the inference of intent to distribute); United States
v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1971) (defendants arrested while manufacturing metham-
phetamine with 8 / pounds of the substance in possession); United States v. Cerrito, 413 F.2d
1270 (7th Cir. 1969) (defendant convicted of possession and sale of amphetamine tablets and
of intent to deliver counterfeit tablets).
14. Language in Harris conveys the court's discomfort with the quantum of evidence.
- Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 408. On the other hand, the evidence in Santiago was
overwhelming:
[Tihe package was identified as a bundle of twenty-five packets of heroin.
Seventeen other bundles were found on the bed, around which [the defendants]
were seated. Also on the bed were strainers, spoons, razor blades, hundreds of
empty glassine packets, and rubber bands. Two additional pouches containing
another half a pound of heroin were found under the bed. The trial judge charac-
terized this as a wholesale drug operation for cutting and bagging heroin which had
an estimated "street value" exceeding $250,000.00.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216, 221, 340 A.2d 440, 442 (1975).
15. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216, 223, 340 A.2d 440, 444 (1975).
16. United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d 1035, 1037 (5th Cir. 1972); quoted in Common-
wealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216, 224, 340 A.2d 440, 444 (1975). Mather was convicted of
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver under the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which contains a provision similar to the Pennsylvania
statute: "[1]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970). The Act has been consistently
interpreted in the federal court to allow the quantity and value of the narcotic as circumstan-
tial evidence from which to infer the purpose and intent with which it is possessed.
17. United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1973); quoted in Common-
wealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216, 224-25, 340 A.2d 440, 444 (1975). King was convicted of
knowingly possessing with an intent to distribute approximately 602 pounds of marihuana, a
Schedule I controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c),(c)(10) (1970), in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
18. See note 14 supra.
19. 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 339 A.2d 103 (1975).
20. Wright is more on point with Harris than either Santiago or Hill because of the
marginal amount possessed and the paucity of other supporting facts and circumstances. See
note 27 infra.
Wright, which was decided by the same divided court 21 that later
decided Harris, affirmed a conviction for possession with intent to deliver
a controlled substance upon considerably less compelling evidence than
was offered in either Santiago or Hill: '[T]he trial court [in Wright] relied
upon three factors: a) the evidence that [defendant] was not an addict; b)
the narcotic being the type which was usually sold to addicts; and, c) the
quantity of heroin involved."
22
The defendant in Wright, who alleged addiction, was examined by
the arresting officer. He later testified that the defendant was not an addict
because certain physical indicia of drug addiction were lacking from the
defendant's person. 23 The police officer, "despite experience in drug
investigations, had no special training to establish expertise in identifying
drug addicts." 24 "[T]he officer admitted [at trial] that he did not know
what [the indicia] looked like.'" 25 The dissent considered this testimony to
be "so speculative as to be of little value."
26
The dissent remained unconvinced that the mere amount possessed by
the defendant, 27 absent additional supportive evidence, was sufficient to
permit the inference of intent to deliver. It proffered instead a catalogue of
common empirical facts and circumstances to support an inference of
intent when the amount of narcotics possessed is equivocal, that is, when
the amount could be intended either for delivery or for personal use.
2 8
Wright and Harris demonstrate confusion and error in Pennsylvania
case law concerning the sufficiency of evidence to prove intent to deliver.
29
There is "no case in Pennsylvania which announces a fixed line to
distinguish between mere possession and possession with intent to de-
21. See note 2 supra.
22. 234 Pa. Super. Ct. at 90, 339 A.2d at 107 (Hoffman, J, dissenting).
23. Id. at 89, 339 A.2d at 107. The officer checked the defendant's arms and veins for
needle marks. He also checked the defendant's nostril area and noticed no inflamation and no
burnt nostril hairs.
24. Id. at 90, 339 A.2d at 107 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). The defendant was never
examined by a doctor to determine drug use as a medical fact.
25. Id. at 91 n.3, 339 A.2d at 108 n.3.
26. Id. at 91, 339 A.2d at 108. The dissent made the following additional remark: "The
second factor, that the narcotic was the type usually sold to addicts, must be discounted
entirely, for it is equally true that it would also be the type of narcotic bought and used by
addicts to support a drug habit." Id. at 91, 339 A.2d at 108 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
27. The defendant possessed twenty-five small glassine packets of heroin. The total
weight of the heroin and quinine mixture at an average of 1.5 grains per bag was approximately
two grams.
28. To support the inference the dissent felt that the following facts should be
considered in addition to quantity:
whether the defendant is a drug user; the possession of paraphernalia for drug
distribution; the purity of the drug; the manner of its packaging; or other admissions
and behavior of the accused indicative of trafficking in rather than simple use of
narcotics . . . These additional factors are absent in the instant case and the
quantity alone does not support the inference of intent to deliver.
234 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 92-93, 339 A.2d 103, 108-09 (Hoffman, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
29. The confusion is less apparent in Santiago, in which the amount is considerable and
the surrounding facts and circumstances unequivocally support the inference of intent.
liver.'" 30 The statute, absent specific quantity limits, 31 allows for eviden-
tiary dispute. The controversy does not concern possession, which has
been either proven or admitted; rather, confusion arises from the question
of the minimum quantum of evidence required to permit the inference of
intent. Without a more palpable litmus for evidencing intent to deliver, the
case law merely echoes the same all-inclusive standard, regardless of
manifold fact situations.32
Prior to Harris, the need for evidence of quantity was viewed as
inversely proportionate to the amount of other evidence presented-as the
quantity possessed increased, the need for additional facts and circum-
stances decreased.33 Implicit in Harris is the logic that any measurable
quantity that will suffice for proof of simple possession can support the
inference of intent to deliver, given proof of certain other facts and
circumstances. 34 The evidentiary standard is elastic; consequently, it is
consistent with Harris to permit the inference of intent even though the
defendant possessed less than the maximum amount carried by the
"normal user" for personal use. 35
This absence of specific statutory limits36 to distinguish mere posses-
sion from possession with intent to deliver necessitates implementing a
procedure to facilitate evaluation of the quantity possessed in relation to the
other facts and circumstances. Expert opinion testimony was utilized to
30. Commonwealth v. Harris, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 359 A.2d 407, 411-12 (1976)
(Hoffman, J., dissenting).
31. Pennsylvania's legislation is an adoption of the Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 801 to 966(1970), which was drafted to achieve a coordinated, codified uniformity
between state and federal legislation and enforcement.
32. Whatisa "sufficient quantity?" Whatare "proper other facts and circumstances?'"
The trier of fact is unaided in the use of its discretion to measure the facts of each case against
such broad standards. There appears to be no coordination given to the evidence of intent.
Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 339 A.2d 103 (1975)
(evidence that defendant was not an addict held, if undisputed, to be strong evidence of intent
to deliver); and Commonwealth v. Felton, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 541 (C.P. Phila. 1974) (possession
of fifty bags of heroin insufficient to permit inference of intent to deliver); with Common-
wealth v. Harris, - Pa. Super, Ct. -, 359 A.2d 407 (1976) (possession of sixteen "half-
spoons" of heroin and testimony of expert pertaining to what the "normal user" ordinarily
possesses sufficient to permit inference of intent to deliver; no evidence of drug use or
non-use).
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 228, 340 A.2d 440 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Hill, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 572, 346 A.2d 314 (1975); Commonwealth v. Sterling, 64
Lanc. 385 (Pa. C.P. 1975); Commonwealth v. Arce, 25 Cumb. 62 (Pa. C.P. 1974);Common-
wealth v. Santos, 24 Cumb. 123 (Pa. C.P. 1974); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 24 Cumb. 59 (Pa.
C.P. 1973). In each of the foregoing decisions there is evidence either of an extremely large
quantity of narcotics or of other facts and circumstances probative of intent to deliver. This,
however, does not mean that there is a coordinated pattern to the kinds of facts presented in
the cases. See note 32 supra.
34. -[The amount . . . is not necessarily crucial . . . if the proper other facts are
present." - Pa. Super. Ct. - n.3, 359 A.2d 407,408 n.3 (1976). The question remains open,
therefore, whether possession may be found "when the amount of the drug involved is not a
usable amount, but rather is only a minute quantity or chemical trace." No case on point has
been decided by Pennsylvania appellate courts. Comment, Possession and Control of Drugs
in Pennsylvania: What Is It?, 10 DuQ. L. REV. 476, 481 (1972).
35. Consider this hypothetical situation: the defendant is arrested for possession of a
small quantity of heroin. If the defendant is not a user, the inference of intent will be permitted
because it is more likely than not that the defendant intends to deliver the substance. The
result would be the same if the defendant is observed attempting to deliver a small amount of
heroin to another, but is arrested prior to delivery. See also note 34 supra.
36. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (a)(30) (Purdon Supp. 1976).
evaluate the quantity possessed by Harris. 37 The expert in Harris consi-
dered the amount of heroin in defendant's possession at the time of the
arrest to exceed the amount carried by the "normal user" for personal
use. 38 Harris is significant because no additional evidence was consi-
dered. 39 The opinion testimony alone was controlling and performed a dual
function-it was used by the prosecution to clarify the quantity, and it was
substituted for proof of additional facts and circumstances. This disting-
uishing aspect of Harris is recorded innocuously in a footnote to the text of
the opinion: "In the case at bar, the detective's expert testimony supplied
sufficient other facts to support the inference.' '40 It is in this dual use of the
expert opinion testimony, coupled with the absence of additional facts and
circumstances, that Harris extended Commonwealth v. Hill 41 and Com-
monwealth v. Wright42 and drastically lowered the quantity of evidence
necessary to support the inference of intent to deliver.
Traditionally, expert testimony is employed when it provides the sole
means of obtaining accurate information about a particular subject, or
when the subject is one transcending the common knowledge and experi-
ence of the lay juror. 43 In cases like Harris expert opinion testimony is
necessary to interpret the quantity of narcotics because it is reasonable to
assume that few jurors are versed in the manner and mode of narcotics
transactions. This does not, however, diminish the prosecution's burden of
proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.44 Opinion
testimony is generally considered the "lowest grade of evidence' 45 and is
"permissible only because, bad as it is, there is nothing better attain-
37. Bald proof of possession of a certain amount, especially when the amount is
equivocal, does not permit the inference of intent to deliver. Since the term "sufficient
quantity" requires definition, testimony from a narcotics expert is needed. Evidence of
quantity, unless the quantity is extremely large, is meaningful only in the context of
contemporary drug usage, custom, and practice. Nevertheless, the expert opinion concerning
the amount, when the amount is equivocal, should not be permitted to constitute all the
evidence of intent to deliver. Other evidence should be required, because "'[i]t is at least as
likely that [the defendant] possessed the drugs for his personal use." Commonwealth v.
Harris, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 359 A.2d 407, 412 (1976) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
38. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 410. The detective in Harris arrived at his
conception of the "normal user" empirically, utilizing "reasonable probabilities." The
detective considered the following indicia: the number of arrests of users in the years
preceding the Harris arrest (over fifty arrests); the approximate total number of arrests of
users in his nine years on the force; the number of arrests of people in the last year who were
subsequently convicted of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (several
dozen); and the number of arrests of people in his nine years on the force who were
subsequently convicted of possession or possession with intent to deliver (hundreds). Id. at
-, 259 A.2d at 408-10. Use of such testimony may be the only means of obtaining information
about narcotics transactions. See note 46 and accompanying text infra.
39. "Thus, appellant stands convicted of possession with attempt to deliver on the...
officer's speculation concerning what the normal drug addict's daily usage is and on the fact
that he possessed sixteen 'half-spoons' of heroin." - Pa. Super. Ct.-,-, 359 A.2d 407,412
(Hoffman, J., dissenting).
40. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, - n.3, 359 A.2d 407, 408 n.3.
41. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 572, 346 A.2d 314 (1975). See note 6 supra.
42. 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 339 A.2d 103 (1975). See notes 19-28 and accompanying text
supra.
43. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-31. (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). See FED. R. EvID.
702. See generally Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Concerning Expert Tes-
timony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
44. Commonwealth v. MacNeil, 461 Pa. 709, 337 A.2d 840 (1975).
45. Dawson v. Pittsburgh, 159 Pa. 317, 325, 28 A. 171, 173 (1893).
able."- 46 Unbridled use of expert testimony threatens the right of the
accused to a fair trial by jury.
47
In Commonwealth v. Heller the court declared that "an opinion is
only an opinion. It creates no fact." 4t Nevertheless, the Harris court
permitted the expert's testimony to supply "sufficient other facts," '4 9
notwithstanding ample access to circumstantial evidence enjoyed by the
prosecution. The weakness of Harris, the dissent indicates, 50 is that the
expert testimony did not supply "other facts." The inferred fact was intent
to deliver; the opinion testimony was a deduction born of one officer's
limited past experience-his abstraction of what the "normal user"
ordinarily carried for personal use.
5'
Viewed in this light, Harris confirms the need for a procedural
safeguard against abuse of the evidentiary process in prosecutions for
possession with intent to deliver. More empirical criteria should be
employed to avoid the uncertainty inherent in the present elastic standard of
sufficient quantity based on facts and circumstances.5 2 The dissents in
Wright53 and Harris5 4 articulate these evidentiary criteria.
55
One workable method of avoiding this uncertainty would be the
adoption of a pattern jury instruction incorporating these criteria. 56 In the
46. Id. at 325, 28 A. at 173.
47. The reason was sometimes given that such testimony usurps the function or
invades the province of the jury. Obviously, these expressions were not intended to
be taken literally, but merely to suggest the danger that the jury might forego
independent analysis of the facts and bow too readily to the opinion of an expert
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12, at 27 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (citations omitted).
48. 369 Pa. 457, 461, 87 A.2d 287, 289 (1952).
49. - Pa. Super. Ct. - at n.3, 359 A.2d at 408 n.3 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 412 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
51. See note 38 supra.
52. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216, 225, 340 A.2d 440, 444 (1975).
53. See note 28 supra.
54. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 359 A.2d at 411 (proof of the purity of the drug or proof of
addiction or non-addiction).
55. A contemporary author has recommended a checklist of factors to be used by the
arresting officer to preserve evidence of possession with intent to deliver. K. JARVtS,
PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE AND CRIMINAL LAW § B3, at 78 (Supp. 1975).
56. This could be accomplished via the rulemaking power of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court under PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c), which states: "The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts
The criteria that coordinate the evidence can be distilled from common, empirical indicia
of the delivery of narcotics. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra. Such evidentiary
criteria have been included in a recently-drafted pattern jury instruction suggested for use in
Pennsylvania courts:
In determining whether it has been proven that the defendant had the intent to
deliver the substance (and not merely the intent toretain it for his personal use) you
should consider all the evidence including the evidence as to (the quantity and value
of the substance) (whether the defendant was an addict or user and, if so, whether
the amount exceeded what he might be expected to have on hand for his own use)
(the manner in which the substance was packaged) (whether the substance was
ready for use or could not be used unless cut or diluted) (whether there was
paraphernalia for cutting, weighing or packaging the substance) (whether the
defendant solicited, or negotiated with, potential buyers of the substance) (whether
the defendant on other occasions sold or otherwise delivered controlled
substances).
A. MURPHY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO DELIVER OR MANUFACTURE; CRIM.
INST. SUBCOMM. OF THE PA. SuP. CT'S COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INST. (Reporter's Draft,
Aug. 25, 1976).
case of possession with intent to deliver, such an instruction would impose
order and consistency on the production of evidence. It would endow the
requirement of sufficient evidence with meaning.
57
Although a pattern jury instruction may not prove to be the panacea
58
for the many problems attendant to proof of intent to deliver, use of the
instruction would gird the trier of fact with an empirical standard against
which to test the evidence; it would motivate the prosecution to present all
the evidence of intent to deliver; and it would have a desirable correlative
effect in the accretion of a coherent body of case law. Finally, use of the
pattern jury instruction would help ensure for the defendant a fair trial in
which every element of the offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Harris demonstrates the current minimum quantity of evidence
necessary to permit the inference of intent to deliver a controlled substance.
A defendant can be convicted of possession wjth intent to deliver based on
proof of possession and the expert opinion testimony of a police officer that
the defendant possessed more than the normal user requires for personal
use. The case represents an extension of prior case law to the extent that this
expert testimony was permitted to perform two functions-it was used to
evaluate the quantity, and it was used as a substitute for "other facts and
circumstances." Although Harris remains the current standard of proof
for intent to deliver heroin in Pennsylvania, it exemplifies the confusion
regarding the standard of proof in similar cases that is certain to endure in
the absence of more concrete evidentiary criteria for circumstantial evi-
dence of possession with intent to deliver.
57. "The reasons given for adoption of pattern jury intructions vary from state to state,
and in order of importance; but generally there are five: accuracy, time savings, impartiality,
intelligibility, uniformity." Note, Pattern Jury Instructions, 40 N. DAK. L. REV. 164, 165
(1964).
Criminal instructions can be made more categorical because of the greater dependence
on the statutory definition of the crime. In this sense, pattern jury insructions would eliminate
many reversals and appeals generated by inaccurate paraphrasing of the controlling statute.
The use of patterned jury insructions is advocated in R. MCBRIDE, THE ART OF
INSTRUCTING THE JURY §§ 9.06-.14 (Supp. 1973).
A collection of accurate, impartial, and understandable pattern jury instructions
should be available for use in criminal cases in each jurisdiction. Counsel and the
court should nonetheless remain responsible for ensuring that the jury is adequate-
ly instructed as dictated by the needs of the individual case, and to that end should
modify and supplement the pattern instructions whenever necessary.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.6(a) (Approved Draft, 1968).
58. See R. MCBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY 9.06 (Supp. 1973); cf.
Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HAST. L.J. 456 (1962).
[Casenote by Lawrence T. Bowman.]

